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ESSAY 
FAMIGRATION (FAM-IMM): THE NEXT FRONTIER IN 
IMMIGRATION LAW 
Kari E. Hong 
 
AMIGRATION, or Fam-Imm law, is the field in which family law 
doctrines, principles, and statutes are employed to critically examine 
the ways in which immigration law is recognizing families. Two recent 
articles—Immigration’s Family Values 1  and Removing Citizens: 
Parenthood, Immigration Courts, and Derivative Citizenship2—explore 
how immigration law is utilizing a different definition of the parent-
child relationship than those found in state family law. The former ar-
gues that the divergent definitions arise from conflicting policy and ob-
jectives manifest in achieving optimal immigration. (Although the cur-
rent immigration policies would not be the ones chosen by the authors, 
the differences are reasonable, or at least understandable, when placed in 
the larger context of existing immigration objectives.) The latter con-
tends that the differences arise from a much more insidious source: The 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) is intentionally distorting 
state family law as a means to expedite the removal of persons (includ-
ing those who have a legitimate claim to citizenship) it has deemed un-
desirable. Even if the author is overstating DHS’s motivations, systemic 
 
1 Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s Family Values, 100 Va. L. Rev. 629 
(2014). 
2 Kari E. Hong, Removing Citizens: Parenthood, Immigration Courts, and Derivative Citi-
zenship, 28 Geo. Immigr. L.J. (forthcoming Nov. 2014).   
F 
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problems such as overburdened immigration court dockets, political 
pressures facing immigration judges, the (alleged) immigrant’s lack of 
access to counsel, and the actual limited appellate review of these deci-
sions render the adjudication of these claims troubling at best. 
The points of disagreement between these pieces speak volumes for 
needed immigration reforms. But in conversation, they combine to high-
light that DHS’s actual policies and practices in recognizing family have 
been understudied. For over twenty-five years, scholars have observed 
how family law intersects with immigration law. This Essay asks what 
can happen if scholars systematize critical family law concepts into the 
conception and practice of immigration law. Over the past couple of 
decades, immigrants—and immigrant families—have undergone a fun-
damental transformation. No longer comprised of parents and children 
emigrating from their foreign homeland, the ease of international travel 
has increased the number of citizens who wish to marry or parent some-
one born abroad. The rise of cross-border relationships prevents immi-
gration law from being the exclusive arm of foreign policy that it was in 
the twentieth century. Immigration policies can no longer categorically 
exclude aliens when such exclusion infringes on a citizen’s right to mar-
ry or parent the alien. Just as Crim-Imm scholarship successfully identi-
fied the ways in which the (purported) civil proceedings of immigration 
law needed the extra constitutional protections found in criminal law, 
Famigration offers the potential to transform the way in which immigra-
tion law operates. Famigration invites the possibility for immigration 
law to incorporate heightened constitutional protections, a means to re-
solve conflicts between federal and state law, and universal, transcen-
dental values such as the best interest of the child, when defining and 
recognizing family. 
I. DHS’S POLICIES AND GOALS IN DETERMINING PARENTAGE 
In their article, Immigration’s Family Values, Professor Kerry 
Abrams and R. Kent Piacenti observe that family law and immigration 
law often deploy different definitions when recognizing a parent-child 
relationship.3 This observation is not too surprising. Families have al-
ways been complicated, and legal rules about their structure and compo-
sition have been constantly evolving as law and public policy attempt to 
either mirror (or reject) the family realities of the day. The marital pre-
 
3 Abrams & Piacenti, supra note 1. 
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sumption of parentage, for example, arose from the proverbial mailman 
casting doubt over who had fathered the only red-headed child in the 
family.4 When DNA tests introduced an ability to conclusively identify 
one man as the father of the child (replacing blood tests that were only 
able to exclude a particular man from the likelihood of being a child’s 
father), the states did not—and have not—resorted to a singular scien-
tific test to determine fatherhood. 
Rather, state family law continues to embrace a variety of factors to 
determine who is (or who should be defined as being) the natural parent 
of a child (and who therefore is liable for financial support and receives 
the rights of custody and control). The most notable example is Michael 
H. v. Gerald D., in which Carol was married to Gerald when she gave 
birth to Victoria.5 The complication arose when their neighbor Michael 
claimed he had had an affair with Carol and he was in fact Victoria’s bi-
ological father. Against medical evidence establishing a 98.7% likeli-
hood that Michael was the biological father, the U.S. Supreme Court up-
held the constitutionality of California’s legitimation statute that “a child 
born to a married woman living with her husband is presumed to be a 
child of the marriage.”6 
In immigration law, family definitions have especially dramatic con-
sequences, as much of U.S. immigration law is based on family catego-
ries that permit citizens to legalize a relative’s status through marriage, 
birth, and adoption, and, when the relative has criminal convictions, to 
forgive otherwise deportable conduct.7 New reproductive technologies 
 
4 As a benefit of marriage, the husband of a woman who gives birth is usually granted the 
legal presumption that he is the natural father of such child, even when there is a conflicting 
claim by a man who is outside of the marriage. 
5 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
6 Id. at 113. California’s statute at issue was later repealed and replaced by an updated par-
entage statutory scheme. See Cal. Fam. Code §§ 7600–7730 (West 2014). When interpreting 
the new parentage statute, the California courts have extended the marital presumption of 
biological parenthood to both women in a recognized same-sex relationship. See Elisa B. v. 
Superior Court of El Dorado Cnty., 117 P.3d 660, 666 (Cal. 2005). Other states are follow-
ing suit and extending the marital presumption of natural parentage to same-sex couples. See 
David Dodge, At the Cutting Edge of Gay Family Law, N.Y. Times Motherlode (June 17, 
2014, 10:05 AM), http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/06/17/at-the-cutting-edge-of-
gay-family-law/ (when dismissing a second-parent adoption petition filed by the non-
gestational mother in a married lesbian couple, a New York judge “ruled that adoption was 
neither ‘necessary nor available’ in this case since a ‘presumption of parenthood’ exists for 
all married couples”). 
7 See e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2012) (permitting entry petition and adjustment of 
status for a citizen’s spouse, child, and parent); id. § 1401 (citizenship for child born to citi-
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and quickly evolving social understandings of family, however, intro-
duce the dilemma as to whether old statutes have the normative and em-
pirical capacity to accurately categorize emerging familial bonds into 
cognizable categories.8 
In their important survey of family law and immigration and citizen-
ship law, Abrams and Piacenti have usefully categorized various family 
formations with such terms as “marital parentage” (conferred through 
marriage), “functional parentage,” (conferred through an adult’s care), 
“genetic parentage” (conferred through biological ties), and “intentional 
parentage” (conferred through contract).9 Their article deftly explains 
the origins of these terms and navigates their modern usage.10 As a 
whole, Abrams and Piacenti’s compilation of the historical and modern 
parentage definitions offers helpful framing and critical analysis of how 
and when immigration and citizenship law determines (and should de-
termine) parentage as a precondition for conferring legal status or citi-
zenship. 
In comparing the family law definitions of parentage to those found in 
immigration and citizenship law, Abrams and Piacenti advance the nor-
mative position “that recognition of intentional and functional parentage 
deserves a more prominent place in the nation’s definition of parentage 
in the immigration and citizenship context.”11 Abrams and Piacenti posit 
that the failure of immigration law to mimic its family law counterpoint 
arises “not because lawmakers have failed to properly incorporate fami-
 
zen parent); id. § 1433(c) (citizenship for adopted child); see also Stanovsek v. Holder, No. 
13-3279, 2014 WL 4723268, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 24, 2014) (permitting spouse of citizen to 
apply for INA § 212(h) waiver to forgive an aggravated felony). The parent-child relation-
ship is also relevant in adjustment (green card) adjudications, asylum cases, and family peti-
tions. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) (visa petitions); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4 (2014) (asylum). “De-
rivative status recognizes the importance of family integrity within American culture and its 
particular significance to newcomers to the community.” Carol Sanger, Immigration Reform 
and Control of the Undocumented Family, 2 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 295, 317–18 (1987).  
8 N.R. Kleinfield, And Baby Makes Four, N.Y. Times, June 19, 2011, at MB1 (“The setup 
is complicated. Griffin’s mother, Carol Einhorn, a fund-raiser for a nonprofit group, is 48 
and single. She conceived through in vitro fertilization with sperm from Mr. Russell, 49, a 
chiropractor and close friend. Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and Sunday nights, Mr. Russell 
stays in the spare room of Ms. Einhorn’s apartment. The other three days he lives on Presi-
dent Street with his domestic partner, David Nimmons, 54, an administrator at a nonprofit. 
Most Sundays, they all have dinner together. ‘It’s not like Heather has two mommies,’ Mr. 
Russell said. ‘It’s George has two families.’”). 
9 Abrams & Piacenti, supra note 1, at 655–707. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 635. 
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ly law principles, but because lawmakers’ interests are not the same in 
diverse contexts. State family law’s primary interests are in privatizing 
the dependency of children . . . .”12 By contrast, Abrams and Piacenti ar-
gue, immigration and citizenship law is informed by “the federal gov-
ernment’s interest in achieving optimal numbers of immigrants and citi-
zens” and “the ferreting out and prevention of fraud.”13 They conclude 
that “[b]ecause of these differences, variations in institutional actors’ at-
titudes toward various kinds of parentage may be inevitable, or, at the 
very least, understandable.”14 
II. THE TROUBLING APPLICATION OF FAMILY LAW IN DERIVATIVE 
CITIZENSHIP CLAIMS 
Abrams and Piacenti are correct in their call for immigration law to 
recognize functional and intended parentage. In Removing Citizens: 
Parenthood, Immigration Courts, and Derivative Citizenship, this au-
thor’s own work focused on citizenship law’s antiquated reliance on ge-
netic parentage in instances of derivative citizenship, which was one of 
the subject matters surveyed by Abrams and Piacenti. Derivative citizen-
ship, the legal process whereby birthright citizenship is passed from a 
citizen parent to a child born outside the United States, is a complicated, 
technical maze, even in a field of law that has become legendary for its 
complexity.15 
Removing Citizens examines the troubling way that immigration pro-
ceedings adjudicate claims of derivative citizenship.16 Often, a child 
 
12 Id. at 634. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
15 See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2012). The derivative citizen statute is found in §§ 301–
309 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401–1409.  
There are at least nine different statutes that may apply to a child, depending on the child’s 
birth date, the parents’ citizenship, the parents’ marital status, and if divorced, the terms of 
custody granted to a citizen parent. Derivative citizenship may be conferred at the time of 
birth, or, if specific conditions are met, retroactively. 
16 “Removal” is the new term for deportation. In 1996, Congress replaced “deportation” 
(for individuals inside of the country) and “exclusion” (for individuals who legally never en-
tered the country) proceedings with “removal” proceedings. See Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 
3009–546. This Article will refer to removal proceedings for all immigration proceedings 
initiated after 1996. Even though removal proceeding is the term for deportation, an alien is 
charged with either deportable grounds or inadmissibility grounds to ascertain whether the 
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with one citizen parent grows up in the United States assuming that she 
is a citizen. If, as an adult, the child is convicted of a crime, she may 
learn in removal proceedings before an immigration judge that her life-
long assumption of U.S. citizenship was incorrect. Although adult chil-
dren in this position are eligible to have their derivative citizenship sta-
tus conferred retroactively, government attorneys regularly contest 
whether the parents who raised them are their “legal” parents under state 
family law. (In extreme cases, government attorneys have even dis-
closed the disturbing news that the parents who raised them are not their 
genetic parents.17) 
Permitting hearings on whether a parent who raised a child is in fact a 
“legal parent” is an example of how federal immigration law is improp-
erly diverging from state family law. In state courts, a third party to a 
family unit—including the government—would not be permitted to col-
laterally attack a functioning parent-child relationship. In family court 
proceedings, states have time bars to protect the child and parent, limit 
the parties who can bring such challenges to the husband or wife (and 
state government may establish paternity only if child support is need-
ed), and will not let even a bona fide challenge exist when no other per-
 
removal can be effected. Compare INA § 237 (deportability grounds), with INA § 212 (in-
admissibility grounds).  
17 See generally Anderson v. Holder, No. CV-11-01662-PHX-DGC, 2012 WL 2813868 (D. 
Ariz. July 10, 2012), aff’d, Anderson v. Holder, No. 09-70249, 527 Fed. App’x. 602 (9th Cir. 
Jun. 12, 2013). As recounted in district court Mr. Anderson “first learned about his family 
secrets and biological origins when the Government disclosed them to [Mr. Anderson] when 
he was appearing pro se in removal proceedings.”  Petitioner’s Statement of Facts to Support 
Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Rule 56, at ¶ 21 (citing to transcribed immigra-
tion proceedings in which Mr. Anderson explained to the immigration judge that “[W]hen [I] 
got these copies of these papers that you guys [the Department of Homeland Security] sent 
me, or that the prosecution sent me, that’s the first time in my life I’ve ever heard anything 
like this, in my life. . . . Yes, I mean, this, this, you know, I’m not, like I said trying to pull 
the wool over anyone’s eyes, or, or, trying to pull some slick move, or any, this is the first 
time I’ve hearing anything like this.  My mother, after finding this out, I confronted my 
mother about it. And, I, and, I told her, I said, you know what, I, I need the truth here. You 
know. And, she, she swears up and down that that [the man who raised him] is my father. 
Unfortunately, he passed away a few years back. . . .”) (citing Immigration Removal Pro-
ceedings, held on January 23, 2008, page 9–10) (on file with the Virginia Law Review).  As 
explained in the mother’s deposition, the U.S. citizen father signed a paternity affidavit, gave 
Mr. Anderson his last name, and placed his name on the birth certificate as being Mr. Ander-
son’s father.  See Deposition of P—A---, February 7, 2012, at 10 (on file with the Virginia 
Law Review).  
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son can step in to serve as the parent that is being challenged. The im-
migration courts, by contrast, permit the federal government to declare 
that the citizen parent who raised a child is in fact a legal stranger. 
Immigration judges are also ignoring state law definitions of family 
matters. On the parent-child question, most state legitimation and par-
entage laws use love, support, and care as proof of parentage. By con-
trast, immigration courts often will declare that blood alone is the sine 
qua non of parentage.18 Although this author’s article focused on the 
cases in which parentage was a key element, derivative citizenship 
claims may depend on the state law definitions of the citizen parents’ 
marital status or the child custody status at relevant times in the child’s 
life. The immigration courts also routinely misapply these state law pro-
 
18 This issue is made complex by Congress’s decision, in 1986, to change the derivative 
citizenship statute to require proof of a blood relationship between an unwed father and a 
child.  See Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. 99-653, 100 Stat. 
3655.  For children born after November 14, 1986, they must follow the requirement of this 
statute and establish a genetic link to any unwed father.  For children born on or before No-
vember 14, 1986, a child may “elect the application of the preamendment [8 U.S.C.] § 
1409(a), which required only legitimation before age 21.”  Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 
426 n.3 (1998); Runnett v. Shultz, 901 F.2d 782, 783 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The applicable law 
for transmitting citizenship to a child born abroad when one parent is a U.S. citizen is the 
statute that was in effect at the time of the child's birth.”   There are numerous policy ar-
guments to amend the statute and eliminate the dispositive nature of genetics in de-
termining parentage. However, in a pernicious turn of events, immigration courts 
are interpreting the old law—that does not have a biology requirement—to some-
how implicitly incorporate the new statute’s blood requirement. See Martinez-
Madera v. Holder, 559 F.3d 937, 942 (9th Cir. 2009). In Martinez-Madera, the pe-
titioner was born in 1953, entitling him to the benefit of the pre-1986 statute. The 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and the Ninth Circuit ruled against the peti-
tioner because he was legitimated by his stepfather, without any blood relations, 
under California law. Of note, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the biological requirement 
based on its mistaken reliance on the post-1986 statute. Id. at 940 n.1. In oral argu-
ment in a different case, Judge Kimberly Wardlaw noted that mistake. Oral Argu-
ment at 13:33, Anderson v. Holder, 527 F. App’x 602 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 09-
70249), available at 
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pk_id=0000006940. The immigra-
tion courts are even requiring mothers to provide such proof, even when § 1409 on-
ly applies to unwed fathers and § 1401(e)—the provision applying to mothers—has 
no such mention at all. See Solis-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1090, 1091 (9th 
Cir. 2005) (holding that by raising the child of her husband’s mistress as her own, 
citizen-mother legitimated the petitioner under California law).  
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visions. For instance, the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) has 
found that a “legal separation” exists only when there is a formal divorce 
order issue. The relevant state law, however, used a broader definition, 
explaining that a legal separation exists at the moment the parties ceased 
living together prior to the formal dissolution of marriage.19 
Such cases cannot be explained as simply the product of immigration 
and citizenship law deploying a unique, federal definition of family law. 
To the contrary, since at least 1949, the BIA has expressly deferred to 
state family law to determine the preconditions for conferring derivative 
citizenship.20 In deferring to state family law, the Ninth Circuit ex-
plained that “because there is no federal law of domestic relations, that 
necessarily means a separation recognized by state law. . . . [O]ur ap-
proach accords with the INS’s long standing policy of looking to state 
law to determine questions of family relations, specifically marriage and 
custody.”21 
As this author considered the specific context of derivative citizen-
ship, I reached a different conclusion from Abrams and Piacenti as to 
why the immigration law is out of sync with family law. Their conclu-
sions, in brief, were that immigration law’s differences arise from two of 
the considered policy differences found in immigration law: determining 
the ideal number of new-immigrants and “ferreting out fraud.”22 It is 
striking that the government has not advanced these rationales in prac-
tice, and it is here that my conclusions diverge from those of Abrams 
and Piacenti in four ways. 
First, there is no policy interest in limiting the parent-child definition 
out of any concern that a broad definition would let in too many new cit-
izens or legal immigrants. For both citizenship and immigration benefits, 
 
19 See Minasyan v. Gonzales, 401 F.3d 1069, 1078–79 (9th Cir. 2005) (“Central to our de-
termination is the fact that in California a separation by virtue of law entails important legal 
consequences under state law. . . . Critically, these consequences flow from the date of the 
separation, not from the date of a court order.”).  
20 See, e.g., Wedderburn v. INS, 215 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2000). When adjudicating a deriv-
ative citizenship claim, Judge Easterbrook observed that “federal law may point to state (or 
foreign) law as a rule of decision, and this is how the INS has consistently understood these 
terms.” Id. at 799 (citing Matter of H—, 3 I. & N. Dec. 742 (BIA 1949)).  
21 Minasyan, 401 F.3d at 1076–77; see also id. (“As the Supreme Court recently empha-
sized, ‘[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, 
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.’” (quoting Elk 
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).  
22 Abrams & Piacenti, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 634. 
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there are no numerical limits on how many children will be citizens by 
birth nor how many children may receive lawful status as dependents.23 
To the contrary, the immediate relatives of a citizen—defined as a 
spouse, parent, and child—are exempted from the annual numerical lim-
its imposed on family immigration.24 
Second, the federal government never has suggested that fraud was an 
issue in its litigation of derivative citizenship claims. Unlike marriage 
where two people could (and in fact do) pretend to be in a legitimate re-
lationship to receive benefits, it is hard to imagine how an adult could 
pretend to love, support, and raise a child for years as part of a long-term 
immigration scheme to confer benefits to any child.25 To the extent that 
the 1986 law was driven by fears that foreign-born individuals would 
falsely claim to be children of U.S. servicemen who were stationed 
abroad, it is the state law’s legitimation process—one in which the fa-
ther must affirmatively claim the child as his own—and not a blood test 
that in fact protects a citizen from the burdens of unintended 
parenthood.26 
 
23 8 U.S.C. § 1151(a), (b) (providing that “immediate relatives,” defined as “children, 
spouses, and parents of a citizen of the United States,” “are not subject to the worldwide lev-
els or numerical limitations” set forth in the INA). 
24 Id. § 1153(d). 
25 There is a legitimate question as to whether marriage fraud is a widespread problem. 
The Immigration Fraud Marriage Act of 1986 was passed to curtail what was perceived as 
widespread immigration fraud. See Immigration Fruad Marriage Amendment of 1986, Pub. 
L. No. 99-639, 100 Stat. 3537.   
Immigration Service proffered to the Congress statistics from a 1983-1984 study that 
purported to show that fully 30 percent of marriage-based visa petitions were fraudu-
lent. Much later, in connection with discovery in a civil suit, it was discovered that top 
INS officials knew the study was statistically flawed and the results unreliable at the 
time the study’s findings were presented to Congress. Congress was never given the 
true figures on the incidence of marriage fraud, nor was it apprised of how often the 
penalties for marriage fraud had been successfully invoked under the old law.  
Mary L. Sfasciotti & Luanne Bethke Redmond, Marriage, Divorce, and the Immigration 
Laws, 81 Ill. B.J. 644, 645 (1993). As for 2009, the number of marriage petitions “denied for 
fraud is tiny: 506 of the 241,154 filed by citizens in the last fiscal year, or two-tenths of 1 
percent (an additional 7 percent were denied on other grounds, like failing to show up for an 
interview).” Nina Bernstein, Do You Take This Immigrant?, N.Y. Times, June 13, 2010, at 
MB1. 
26 See generally Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 425 n.2, 426 n.3, 435 (1998). The Court 
rejected an equal protection claim brought by a citizen-father Mr. Miller on behalf of his for-
eign-born daughter. The daughter, born in the Philippines, did not have contact with Mr. 
Miller for many years. On his own, he filed a paternity action in the state of Texas to declare 
himself the biological father. Unfortunately, the daughter was 22 years old at that time, one 
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Third, in federal court litigation, the federal government has never ar-
ticulated a sound policy reason for using the immigration law definitions 
of family instead of the more nimble and robust definitions found in the 
states. Instead, the government seems to intentionally distort family law 
in order to expedite the removal of individuals who have criminal con-
victions. In 2012, the Ninth Circuit strongly criticized the government 
for its differing—and often conflicting—interpretations of state parent-
age statutes, pointing out that “the government’s position is that the 
word ‘legitimation’ should be read broadly when a broad reading results 
in the denial of citizenship, and narrowly when a narrow reading results 
in the denial of citizenship.”27 Referring to the government’s litigation 
position as “unfair as well as erroneous,” the court captured the regular 
abuses that occur in immigration proceedings.28 
Fourth, the deployment of state family law is not limited to the de-
rivative citizenship context. In defining who is a child for purposes of 
receiving numerous immigration benefits, Congress has directed immi-
gration officials to use the law of “the child’s residence or domicile or 
under the law of the father’s residence or domicile, whether in the Unit-
ed States or elsewhere,” to determine parentage.29 Just like determining 
which criminal convictions have consequences under immigration law, 
Congress has determined that the family laws of each of the fifty states 
is a means to decide which individuals are defined as the family mem-
bers of citizens and accordingly receive immigration and citizenship 
benefits. 
In this respect, Abrams and Piacenti’s contention that the federal gov-
ernment has a legitimate disagreement with state law definitions of fami-
ly glosses over salient, institutional problems that citizens and their fam-
ilies encounter: Rather than rendering a decision over a legal issue 
within their expertise, immigration judges have to grapple with the com-
plexities of family law while facing political and workload pressures that 
favor removal for reasons quite other than the application of family 
law.30 Detained individuals, many without counsel, face immigration 
 
year past the date by which a child must be legitimated by a citizen father to receive deriva-
tive citizenship.  
27 Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012). 
28 Id. 
29 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(C).  
30 Robert Katzmann, Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Immigration 
and the Courts, Roundtable Discussion at the Brookings Institution 49 (Feb. 20, 2009) [here-
inafter Brookings Institution Panel], available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/events/
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judges who are overworked, understaffed, and have no training in the 
family laws of the fifty states.31 Unique to other administrative judges, 
immigration judges lack independence from the prosecutor arguing a 
case before them.32 “Immigration judges cannot hold federal prosecutors 
from the Department of Homeland Security in contempt of court be-
cause the judges are considered to be lawyers working for the Justice 
Department . . . .”33 The job security of immigration judges has been 
conditioned on whether they are ordering enough people removed from 
the country.34 Under Attorney General John Ashcroft, BIA judges were 
 
2009/2/20%20immigration/20080220_immigration.pdf (“[W]hile recognizing the real prob-
lems in the system, we shouldn’t forget those immigration judges who are doing outstanding 
jobs, and, unfortunately, they get tarnished when there are these instances of those immigra-
tion judges who are not performing . . . .”). 
31 It is estimated that, in 2013, 40% of individuals in immigration court did not have coun-
sel. See Erin Kelley, Immigration Judges Call for Reform, USA Today (Aug. 27, 2014, 5:58 
PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/08/27/immigration-judges-
reform/14704039/.  The immigration judges have a larger caseload with less help than their 
federal court counterparts. As of 2009, each immigration judge heard approximately 1200 
cases each year, which requires the judge to hear and decide, on average, one hundred cases 
each month at a rate of five cases each day of the week. Such a degree of efficiency is unu-
sual for courts. A federal district judge, by contrast, considers and decides 480 cases each 
year, at a rate of forty cases each month and just over one case per day. In addition to the 
fewer number of cases, federal district courts have the benefit of at least two law clerks that 
assist each judge. In the immigration court system, four immigration judges share one law 
clerk. See Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Arti-
cle I Immigration Court, 13 Bender’s Immigr. Bull. 3, 14 (Jan. 1, 2008); Stephen H. Legom-
sky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 Duke L.J. 1635, 1652 (2010); Brookings 
Institution Panel, supra note 30, at 7–8 (statement of Russell Wheeler, Visiting Fellow, 
Brookings Institution). 
32 Dana Leigh Marks, An Independent Immigration Court Is Needed, N.Y. Times Room 
for Debate (July 12, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/07/12/how-can-
the-asylum-system-be-fixed/an-independent-immigration-court-is-needed (“The National 
Association of Immigration Judges believes that establishment of an independent agency or 
Article I court (like the tax or bankruptcy courts) rather than the current placement of the 
courts within the Department of Justice, is an essential reform.”). 
33 See Kelley, supra note 31. 
34 See Marks, supra note 31, at 3–4 (“At present, the Attorney General, our nation’s chief 
prosecutor in terrorism cases, acts as the boss of the judges who decide whether an accused 
non-citizen should be removed from the United States. At the same time, despite the creation 
of the DHS and the placement of trial-level immigration prosecutors there, the Attorney 
General continues to supervise a critical element of the prosecution process, the Office of 
Immigration Litigation (OIL), which defends immigration cases on behalf of the government 
in the circuit courts of appeals. This conflict of interest between the judicial and prosecutori-
al functions creates a significant (and perhaps even fatal) flaw to the immigration court struc-
ture, one that is obvious to the public and undermines confidence in the impartiality of the 
courts.”).  
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fired based on their approval rates.35 (Not surprisingly, since 2002, the 
denial rate of the BIA rose from 59% to 93%.36) For the few cases that 
reach the federal courts (fewer than 10% of immigration decisions are 
appealed),37 government attorneys will often argue that the meaning of 
the relevant state statute is whatever favors the removal of the claimed 
citizen.38 
In Removing Citizens, this author argued—perhaps somewhat polemi-
cally—that the government’s distortion of family law in immigration 
proceedings seems intentional and that, given the systemic problems in 
the adjudication process, the applicants (and when available, their coun-
sel) face an unfair uphill battle in navigating the complexities of family 
law to prove parentage (and thus citizenship). Given that citizens are 
sometimes wrongly removed from this country, these practices are in 
urgent need of reform.39 
 
35 The Attorney General fired the BIA judges who had decided in favor of non-citizens at 
higher rates than the Board’s average . See Brookings Institution Panel, supra note 30, at 22 
(statement of Professor Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Georgetown University Law Center); see 
also Marks, supra note 31, at 14 (criticizing an internal DOJ investigation into immigration 
judges decisions because, “with the clear memory of the not-too-distant personnel purge at 
the BIA,” the investigation had a “decidedly chilling effect on Immigration Judges”). 
36 Prior to Attorney General Ashcroft’s reforms, the BIA denied alien claims at a rate of 
59%. One year after Attorney General Ashcroft’s reforms were introduced, the denial rate 
climbed to 86%. By 2005, the denial rate rose to 94%. As of 2010, the denial rate is 93%. 
See Anna O. Law, The Immigration Battle in American Courts 151 (2010); Solomon Moore 
& Ann M. Simmons, Immigrant Pleas Crushing Federal Appellate Courts, L.A. Times (May 
2, 2005), http://articles.latimes.com/2005/may/02/local/me-backlog2.  
37 In 2012, 187,270 immigration court decisions were issued and aliens filed 15,841 
appeals, which is 8% of the cases. See U.S. Department of Justice, Executive Office for Im-
migration Review FY 2012 Statistical Year Book (March 2013) at X1.  In 2008, the rate of 
appeal of 9% and in 2009 through 2012, the rate was 8%.  Id.  “Studies show immigrants 
with legal representation are three to four times more likely to win their case, yet nationwide, 
only about 35 percent have any kind of lawyer.”  Nina Bernstein, In City of Lawyers, Many 
Immigrants Fighting Deportation Go It Alone, N.Y. Times Mar. 12, 2009 at A21. 
38 See Anderson v. Holder, 673 F.3d 1089, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012).  
39 A reasonable estimate from the few studies on whether Immigration and Customs En-
forcement (“ICE”) is wrongfully detaining citizens places the number of individuals who are 
asserting derivative citizenship claims in removal proceedings between 50 and 500 people 
each year. See generally Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Citizens Detained and Deported: 2010 
Fact Sheet, States Without Nations (July 15, 2010, 4:11 PM), 
http://stateswithoutnations.blogspot.com/2010/07/us-citizens-detained-and-deported-
2010.html (reporting that between 2006 and 2008, 82 out of 8027 (or approximately 1%) of 
ICE detainees who were detained in Arizona were found to be a U.S. citizen by an immigra-
tion court). In 2011, the Warren Institute issued findings of its independent investigation that 
reported 3600—or 1.6%—of those detained in the Secure Communities program from 2008 
to 2011 were citizens. See Aarti Kohli et al., Warren Institute, Secure Communities by the 
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III. THE CALL FOR A FORMAL FAMILY IMMIGRATION LAW FIELD 
For over twenty-five years, legal scholars have engaged in important 
conversations over how family law and immigration law intersect and 
inform one another.40 It is time to think hard about how we might sys-
tematize critical family law concepts into the conception and practice of 
immigration law, perhaps in ways that are analogous to what has been 
achieved in the realms of criminal and immigration law, now known as 
“Crim-Imm” or “Crimmigration”.41 Crim-Imm scholars advanced (and 
continue to advance) notable ideas: on the doctrinal level, the immigra-
tion system is in need of reform, and on the empirical level, rules of 
criminal procedure may correct some deficiencies arising in the func-
tioning of immigration courts.42 The scholarship has included conversa-
tions that imagine heightened constitutional protections,43 critique immi-
 
Numbers: An Analysis of Demographics and Due Process 4 (2011), available at 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf.  
40  Although this list does not at all intend to be exclusive, notable contributions have been 
many: See e.g., David B. Thronson, You Can’t Get Here from Here: Toward a More Child-
Centered Immigration Law, 14 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 58, 58–60 (2006); Sanger, supra note 
7, at 317–18; Jennifer M. Chacon, Loving Across Borders: Immigration Law and the Limits 
of Loving, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. 345, 358 (2007)); Stephen H. Legomsky, Rationing Family 
Values in Europe and America: An Immigration Tug of War Between States and Their Su-
pra-National Associations, 25 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 807, 808–09 (2011); María Pablón López, 
A Tale of Two Systems: Analyzing the Treatment of Noncitizen Families in State Family 
Law Systems and Under the Immigration Law System, 11 Harv. Latino L. Rev. 229, 230 
(2008); Bridgette A. Carr, Incorporating a “Best Interests of the Child” Approach into Immi-
gration Law and Procedure, 12 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L.J. 120, 123–24 (2009); Shani M. 
King, U.S. Immigration Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of Family: Toward a 
Functional Definition of Family that Protects Children’s Fundamental Human Rights, 41 
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 509, 510–13 (2010); Lori A. Nessel, Families at Risk: How Errant 
Enforcement and Restrictionist Integration Policies Threaten the Immigrant Family in the 
European Union and the United States, 36 Hofstra L. Rev. 1271, 1273–74 (2008);  Over the 
past decade, Professor Abrams has made numerous and notable contributions to this field. 
See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration 
Law, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 641 (2005); Kerry Abrams, Immigration Status and the Best Inter-
ests of the Child Standard, 14 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 87 (2006); Kerry Abrams, Immigration 
Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625, 1634 (2007); Kerry Abrams, 
Marriage Fraud, 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012).  
41 Juliet P. Stumpf, Doing Time: Crimmigration Law and the Perils of Haste, 58 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1705, 1726–30 & n.96 (2011) (discussing some forms and functions of crimmigration 
law).  
42 Conversation with Daniel Kanstroom (Sept. 26, 2014).  
43 See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, The Right to Deportation Counsel in Padilla v. Kentucky: 
The Challenging Construction of the Fifth-and-a-Half Amendment, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1461, 
1464–66 (2011); Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the 
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 Duke L.J. 1563, 1570 (2010); Nan-
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gration proceedings and enforcement practices,44 and caution (warnings 
usually arising from criminal law practitioners) that the criminal proce-
dure protections often sought might not in fact be the panacea that they 
purport to be.45 Padilla v. Kentucky embodies an important accumulation 
of some of these ideas, in which the Supreme Court endorsed (and cited) 
scholarship advancing heightened constitutional protections to non-
citizens in what had previously been deemed civil proceedings.46 
The area of family immigration law, or likewise “Fam-Imm” or 
“Famigration,” deserves similar recognition. Immigration law’s deter-
minations of family are in equal need of examination, scrutiny, and re-
form. Simply put, the complexities involved in defining families can no 
longer be confined to family law scholars. 
First, questions of family formation—who is the child, spouse, or par-
ent of a citizen—determine which person may enter or remain in the 
United States. Viewed only as an immigration question, Fiallo v. Bell 
explained that “over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of 
 
cy Morawetz, Determining the Retroactive Effect of Laws Altering the Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions, 30 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1743, 1745 (2003) (correctly predicting the 
holding in Cardenas-Delgado v. Holder, 720 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2013), that § 212 relief is 
not limited to plea agreements). 
44 See, e.g., Juliet P. Stumpf, States of Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power over 
Immigration, 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1557, 1558 (2008) (critiquing the trend of states using criminal 
law to control immigration); Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: 
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 469, 471–72 
(2007) (observing that the “theories, methods, perceptions, and priorities” of criminal law 
enforcement have been incorporated into immigration proceedings, while the procedural pro-
tections of criminal adjudication have been explicitly rejected); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring 
the Boundaries Between Immigration and Crime Control after September 11th, 25 B.C. 
Third World L.J. 81, 83–86 (2005) (discussing how the post-9/11 War on Terror blurred 
criminal enforcement and immigration regulation); Margaret H. Taylor, Dangerous by De-
cree: Detention Without Bond in Immigration Proceedings, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 149, 149–50 
(2004); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to 
Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 
289, 289 (2008) (“[F]or noncitizens who have been the subject of both removal and tradi-
tional criminal proceedings, the two can be indistinguishable but for the relative lack of pro-
cedural protections and the often graver liberty interest at stake in the former.”). 
45 See, e.g., Ingrid V. Eagly, Gideon’s Migration, 122 Yale L.J. 2282, 2282 (2013) (dis-
cussing “lessons learned from the criminal system’s implementation of Gideon” when con-
sidering “the appropriate scope and design for an immigration defender system”). 
46 See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1482 (2010) (citing Gabriel J. Chin & 
Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty 
Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 713–18 (2002)). 
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Congress more complete than it is over the admission of aliens.”47 Under 
the plenary power doctrine, “the power to expel or exclude aliens [is] a 
fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political 
departments largely immune from judicial control.”48 But today’s immi-
grant family is different from its twentieth-century counterpart. Today’s 
immigrants are not simply those who (like my own grandparents and 
great-grandparents) were existing families of foreign nationals, emigrat-
ing together with their worldly belongings packed in one trunk and 
dreams of a better life propelling them to either Ellis or Angel Islands. 
Modern travel—and the Internet—has introduced a way in which love 
can transform a quick intended vacation into a serendipitous encounter 
in which a U.S. citizen will now seek to marry or parent a person who 
was born abroad. 
On October 2, 2014, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kerry v. 
Din, which involves the visa denial to an Afghan national.49 The Kabul 
consulate informed the Afghan national that he was inadmissible due to 
“terrorist activities” and then invoked provisions permitting it to neither 
disclose nor have reviewed its determination. The Afghan’s wife, how-
ever, was a U.S. citizen and argued that her constitutional rights were 
violated if the consulate’s actions are unreviewable. Famigration offers a 
means to recognize that immigration policy is no longer the exclusive 
arm of foreign policy that it once was. When formerly unreviewable pol-
icies and practices implicate a citizen’s fundamental right to choose his 
or her spouse, in this important respect, the immigrant is no longer a 
stranger to this land. The mapping of citizens’ constitutional rights into 
areas previously conscribed as foreign would permit opportunities for 
oversight. With the introduction of citizen family interests, the plenary 
power doctrine and other non-reviewability doctrines may in fact yield 
to the reality that the bars at issue unfairly impede upon a citizen’s inter-
ests. 
 
47 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citing Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 
339 (1909)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
48 Id. (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)) (cita-
tions and internal quotation marks omitted). 
49 Din v. Kerry, 718 F.3d 856, 860 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When the denial of a visa implicates 
the constitutional rights of an American citizen, we exercise a highly constrained review 
solely to determine whether the consular official acted on the basis of a facially legitimate 
and bona fide reason.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. granted, 82 
U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014) (No. 13-1402). 
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Second, Famigration invites new scrutiny into how functional con-
flicts between federal and state law are best resolved. Emerging issues in 
family law are often entangled with immigration and citizenship issues. 
In 2012, the U.S. State Department denied a citizen mother’s application 
to confer citizenship to her newly born twins.50 The citizen mother was a 
single mother who had become pregnant using an anonymous donor. 
The embassy stated that it had to have proof of the sperm donor’s na-
tionality before granting citizenship to the children.51 The authority for 
such action was the State Department’s own regulations governing how 
the matter should be resolved. This outcome is contrary to most state 
law determinations of parentage when children are conceived with the 
use of sperm banks.52 Indeed, in October 2014, the USCIS collaborated 
with the Department of State to reverse its prior position and redefine 
“mother” and “parent” to include “mothers using assisted reproductive 
technology regardless of whether they are the genetic mothers.”53 This 
policy change occurred quietly, with unknown reasons and champions. 
In another example, in September 2014, Brazil permitted a child to have 
three parents—his two lesbian mothers and their friend who served as a 
sperm donor and asked to be the child’s father.54 Although that case did 
 
50 See Michelle Chabin, In Vitro Babies Denied U.S. Citizenship, USA Today (Mar. 
19, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-03-19/in-vitro-
citizenship/53656616/1.  
51 Id. 
52 See Cal. Fam. Code § 7613(b) (West 2014) (“The donor of semen provided to a licensed 
physician and surgeon or to a licensed sperm bank for use in assisted reproduction of a 
woman other than the donor’s spouse is treated in law as if he were not the natural parent of 
a child thereby conceived, unless otherwise agreed to in a writing signed by the donor and 
the woman prior to the conception of the child.”). But see Jason P. v. Danielle S., 171 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 789, 790–91 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (not permitting statute to bar parentage determi-
nation to known sperm donor who acted as a father to a child once born). 
53 See USCIS Expansd The Definition of “Mother” and “Parent” To Include Gesta-
tional Mothers Using Assisted Reproductive Technology, (Oct 28, 2014) 
http://www.uscis.gov/news/uscis-expands-definition-mother-and-parent-include-gestational-
mothers-using-assisted-reproductive-technology-art 
54 See Brazilian Baby Registered with Three Parents, BBC News (Sept. 13, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-29195890 (“For the first time in Brazil, a 
judge in southern Rio Grande do Sul state has permitted a baby to be registered with two 
mothers and a father. . . . [All three parties requested that their names appear on the birth cer-
tificate.] The women married two months ago and the father was a male friend. . . . Judge 
Cunha said that all three parents had been involved during the pregnancy in the preparations 
for the arrival of the child. ‘Being a father and a mother is above all about taking care and 
fulfilling tasks. I feel sure that for this child the possibility of happiness will be very great,’ 
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not involve a parent who was a citizen, similar situations are arising (in-
cluding those involving a citizen father and non-citizen surrogate), 
which are being newly litigated in immigration proceedings.55 As dis-
cussed in Part II, the immigration scheme already incorporates and de-
fers to existing state (and foreign) family law when defining the terms 
“child,” “parent,” and “spouse.” These emerging issues demand over-
sight as to whether immigration officials are faithfully applying existing 
family law when appropriate or applying uniform federal definitions as 
required by law, policy, and common sense. 
Third, analogous to how Crim-Imm introduced heightened constitu-
tional protections into a civil proceeding, it seems like Fam-Imm schol-
arship might be able to import more universal, idealized concepts into 
the application of the otherwise technocratic, regulatory scheme of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act. Family law is able to adapt and re-
spond to emerging families in part because of the accepted norm that the 
best interest of the child prevails. Marriage law is likewise evolving. A 
generation ago, federal courts gave unquestioned deference to a state’s 
exercise of its police power to exclude certain people from marriage. By 
contrast, the state’s role in contemporary marriage is to reward those 
who choose to marry. In a fundamental shift, federal courts now scruti-
nize whether a state may withhold the tangible benefits of marriage 
when such deprivation infringes on a family’s dignity and an individu-
al’s means of self-definition.56 The practice of family law thus blankets 
emerging families with protections arising from doctrines aspiring to 
view children and parents as having more than legal rights but also 
transcendent rights in the receipt of love, dignity, and care. 
 
the judge said. The baby’s birth certificate bears the name of two mothers, a father and six 
grandparents.”). 
55 Conversation with Sharon Dulberg, practicing immigration attorney in San Francisco, 
California (June 20, 2014).  
56 Compare Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Minn. 1971) (denying suit to permit 
same-sex couple to marry because “in commonsense and in a constitutional sense, there is a 
clear distinction between a marital restriction based merely upon race and one based upon 
the fundamental difference in sex”), with Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 
941, 954 (Mass. 2013) (“Marriage also bestows enormous private and social advantages to 
those who choose to marry.”), and United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (“[A] 
far-reaching legal acknowledgment of the intimate relationship between two people, a rela-
tionship deemed by the State worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other mar-
riages, [which] reflects both the community’s considered perspective on the historical roots 
of the institution of marriage and its evolving understanding of the meaning of equality.”) 
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What if various forms of defenses to removal started with the premise 
that the federal government may not separate citizen children from their 
parents?57 What if petitions by citizens to marry were presumed valid 
and parentage questions directed to be resolved in favor of the al-
ien/alleged citizen? The summer’s surge of unaccompanied minors ar-
riving in the United States highlighted how immigration law has been 
undertaking steps to protect minors in immigration proceedings. Despite 
its shortcomings, the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act 
(“TVPRA”) recognizes that unaccompanied minors present “specialized 
needs” that require offering heightened substantive and procedural pro-
tections than those offered to adults.58 What if the specialized needs of 
minors extended into specialized protections that citizens have when de-
termining their own family composition? What if immigration law fa-
vored unity over enforcement? Although numerous objections to these 
policy changes exist, what would happen if Famigration scholarship 
helped reshaped assumptions behind existing policies and redefined the 
measure of success? 
There is no doubt that family formation as defined under the laws of 
the United States and abroad will continue to advance in unimaginable 
ways and combinations. Family law is unique in that its discretionary 
standards are designed to be responsive to emerging families not yet im-
agined when statutes were written. Given that Congress has directed 
immigration officials to defer to family law in ascertaining the meaning 
of family, and given that immigration families often include citizens, it 
is time to hold the federal government accountable to the faithful and 
fair application of these standards. The academy has an ability to recon-
 
57 Anita Ortiz Maddali, The Immigrant “Other”: Racialized Identity and the Devaluation of 
Immigrant Family Relations, 89 Ind. L.J. 643, 679 (2014) (“An undocumented parent’s in-
terest in raising her child is no less fundamental than a citizen parent’s interest.”). Although 
he has not formulated an express theory in any written opinions, Judge Harry Pregerson has 
often queried why the interests of citizen children do not have more consideration in the ad-
judication of immigration laws that determine whether parents have the right to remain in the 
United States. See Oral Argument at 17:58, 21:24, Alejo-Ceja v. Holder, 356 F. App’x 50 
(9th Cir. 2009) (Nos. 05-76475, 06-71150, 06-72543), available at 
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view.php?pk_id=0000000300 (after discussing the 
rights of citizen children in their parents’ case, the panel requested the government to con-
sider mediation to resolve the case when issues of fairness are present).  
58 8 U.S.C. § 1232(d)(8). Although many criticize its application, § 1232 attempts to place 
minor children in housing or foster care rather than detention, secure the services of pro bono 
counsel, appoint child advocates to detention centers, and provide training for those adjudi-
cating the asylum claims. 
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sider doctrinal and empirical norms. It is thus time to commence schol-
arly conversations on how transcendent family law principles may rec-
ognize the families that citizens and their immigrant relatives have en-
gendered. 
 
